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The Unintended
Effects of Government-Subsidized
Weather Insurance
These programs are a boon to the wealthy and encourage
development in disaster-prone areas.

C

✒ By Omri Ben-Shahar and Kyle Logue

atastrophes from severe weather are perhaps the costliest accidents humanity faces.
While we are still a long way from technologies that would abate the destructive
force of storms, there is much we can do to
reduce their effect. True, we cannot regulate
the weather, but through smart governance
and correct incentives we can influence human exposure to the
risk of bad weather. We may not be able to control wind or storm
surge, but we can prompt people to build sturdier homes with
stronger roofs far from floodplains. We call these catastrophes
“natural disasters,” but they are the result of a combination of natural forces and, we show here, often imprudent and shortsighted
human decisions induced by questionable government policies.
Regulating weather risk is an increasingly urgent social issue.
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and Hurricane Sandy in 2012 brought
unprecedented property damage to the Gulf and coastal northeastern states. As a result of an enormous development enterprise,
the majority of Florida real estate now lies in coastal areas affected
by hurricane activity. And the potential rise of sea level and the
resulting erosion of the coastline are putting at risk large chunks
of prime real estate in numerous regions.
Omri Ben-Shahar is the Leo and Eileen Herzel Professor of Law and Kearney

Director of the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at the University of
Chicago. Kyle Logue is the Wade H. and Dores M. McCree Collegiate Professor of
Law at the University of Michigan Law School.
This article is condensed from their paper, “The Perverse Effects of Subsidized
Weather Insurance,” forthcoming in the Stanford Law Review, Vol. 68.

Our thesis is simple: the most effective way to prepare for
storms is through disaster insurance. But this preparation would
not simply take the form that is commonly thought: insurance as
a form of post-disaster relief. Rather, we see insurance as a form
of private regulation of safety—a contractual device controlling
and incentivizing behavior prior to the occurrence of losses.
Buying insurance is a transaction in which policyholders are
prompted to adopt loss mitigation measures. Insurance contracts
attach prices to risky behavior and thus force insurance buyers to
factor the risk into their decision. Homeowners’ property insurance, by pricing the cost of choosing to live in the path of storms,
sends a crucial price signal that could be a key ingredient in driving community development and individual location decisions.
Unfortunately, in the United States, insurance is denied its
potential role as an efficient regulator of pre-storm conduct. It
does not give people price signals regarding the cost of living in
severe weather regions and it does not induce rational community
development and infrastructure investment. American insurance
fails to achieve those straightforward and enormously important
roles for a simple reason: it is provided by the government in a subsidized manner. Insurance premiums are deliberately suppressed—
often dramatically so—thus failing to alert private parties who
purchase property insurance to the true risk of living dangerously.
It allows those private parties to (rationally) assume excessive risk
and dump the cost of their coastal living upon taxpayers. We argue
that much of the development of storm-stricken coastal areas is
due to insurance subsidies and would not be justified otherwise.

RamonBerk/thinkstock

This is only the first part of the bad news. There is more, and
it gets uglier. Public debates over subsidized weather insurance
often ignore the over-development and excessive risk distortion,
because they focus on a myth: the myth that insurance must always
be affordable. Subsidies are necessary, policymakers have told us
repeatedly, because they help support low-income and workingclass people who might otherwise be unable to afford insurance
and would not be able to remain in their homes. Subsidizing
weather insurance is “our moral duty to the poorest people and
working people and lower middle income people,” in the words of
then-congressman Barney Frank (D–Mass.). The subsidies prevent
“working families who are doing everything they can to put food on
the table” from losing their homes, according to Sen. M. K. “Heidi”
Heitkamp (D–N.D.). The subsidy, in other words, is thought to promote a redistribution that benefits economically weak populations.
We have long suspected that this justification is false. Our
suspicion rested on the puzzling differential treatment of hurricanes versus tornados. These two types of severe storms cause
similar aggregate magnitudes of property destruction, but federal
subsidies apply to flood losses caused by hurricanes, not to wind
losses caused by tornadoes. This was puzzling because hurricane
victims live closer to water than tornado victims, and it is generally
known that living close to water is a privilege of the affluent. This

pattern seemed inconsistent with the affordability-of-insurance
rationale. We therefore studied the insurance data and we now
have evidence that the weather insurance subsidy scheme is indeed
a boon to the elite; a redistribution in favor of the wealthy. We
present this new evidence here.
Our study, and in particular our findings regarding the myth
of affordability, are intended to shed light on recent legislative
activity, which unfortunately only made things worse. In the
aftermath of Hurricane Sandy and the enormous bill that the
U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency—the agency that
administers the federal subsidies for flood insurance—had to foot,
Congress with bipartisan support enacted the Biggert–Waters
Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012. It intended to scale back
the subsidies and had the potential to provide better incentives
for human preparedness for floods.
But Congress did not let this laudable new statute live long
enough to do any good. Immediately after it was enacted, subsidy
recipients—now scheduled to lose their subsidies—protested. Congress quickly reacted—again, with a rare showing of bipartisan consensus—enacting what amounts to almost a full repeal of the 2012
reform. The Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014
restored virtually all of the federal subsidies and cross-subsidies
for flood insurance. Our results show that the rhetorical premise
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invoked by supporters of this act—that hard-working low-income
people need it to keep their homes—is misguided. The beneficiaries
of weather insurance subsidies are not low-income folks.

FEMA to keep premiums at no more than 1 percent of the value
of the coverage, which in many flood territories is dramatically
below true risk.

The Existing Subsidy Scheme

Wind insurance /

Historically, flood risks were covered through private insurance, if policyholders purchased it as an added coverage, priced
separately from the basic homeowners policy. But many property
owners opted not to purchase the flood coverage, political and
public pressure often led to the federal government providing
post-disaster relief, and some floods were simply mind-bogglingly large, producing wide-scale flood-related losses. Those
realities led Congress to create the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP). Through it, the federal government underwrites flood insurance policies at rates that are set by FEMA
and subsidized by the Treasury Department. Of course, in the
presence of such subsidized options, private companies cannot
compete in this niche, and government-provided flood policies
dominate the market.
The goal of the NFIP was to condition participation in the
subsidized program on communities’ adoption of floodplain
management ordinances that reduce future flood risks to new
construction. Congress also made the purchase of NFIP policies
mandatory for properties that are in certain flood zones and
that are subject to federally regulated mortgages. But the rates
charged by NFIP to its policyholders violate basic insurance
fundamentals. First, they are based on flood maps that are often
out of date. Second, property owners in high-risk areas pay well
below actuarial rates. And third, political influence, rather than
market forces, shapes the process of characterizing particular
areas as flood-prone and eligible for subsidies.
The NFIP has been operating at a massive deficit, estimated
in 2012 to be around $24 billion. That prompted lawmakers to
enact the Biggert–Waters Act, initiating a gradual elimination of
the subsidies. The act was designed to phase out the subsidies
entirely for certain “repetitive loss properties,” second homes,
business properties, homes that have been substantially improved
or damaged, and homes sold to new owners. It also permitted a
faster pace of rate increases (25 percent annually, up from the
previous 10 percent rate hike cap).
However, the backlash from property owners along coastal
areas, where resulting premium increases were the greatest, was
swift and effective. In some areas, there were reports of homeowners’ premiums rising 10-fold. The concern expressed by many
lawmakers, on behalf of their angry constituents, was that unless
the new law was repealed, people wouldn’t be able to remain in
their homes.
The political pressure was so successful that even Rep. Maxine
Waters (D–Calif.), one of the co-authors of the 2012 legislation,
voted in favor of repealing it. In 2014, Congress passed the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act, which largely restored
the old subsidy scheme. For example, the new law also called on

Another category of large-scale, governmentsold insurance for weather risk includes state-owned insurance
corporations that specialize in wind-damage coverage. Most
prominent among them is Florida’s Citizens Property Insurance
Corporation, which provides the vast majority of the wind insurance for properties on the coast of Florida.
Like a private insurance company, Citizens prices its policies
based on risk. It divides the state into 150 geographic rating
territories and sets its rates based on weather patterns, construction methods, and past losses in each territory. But there is one
big difference compared to private insurance. Like the premiums charged for flood coverage at the federal level by NFIP, the
premiums Citizens collects from Florida policyholders are far
below what is necessary to cover the full risk, and are politically
mandated to be so (as state regulations limit Citizens’ ability to
raise rates). Citizens does not face the same loss constraints that
private insurers do; if the premiums are not enough to pay for
the wind damage, Citizens can cover the shortfall by passing it
on to Florida’s taxpayers.
Affordability?

The subsidies embodied in government insurance are an
intended feature because they are thought to favor economically
weak homeowners; they are definitely not thought to be a bailout
for the rich. “This is not about the millionaires in mansions on
the beach…. These are middle-class, working people living in
normal, middle-class houses doing their best to raise their kids,
contribute to their communities, and make a living,” explained
then-senator Mary Landrieu (D–La.). This perception explains
why even people not affected by weather insurance subsidies (but
who, perhaps unbeknownst to them, pay taxes to fund them)
strongly support the subsidies. In one survey, only 15 percent
of unaffected Florida citizens supported the premium increases.
The cross-subsidy created by government-sold insurance follows,
then, a distinct logic: it moves from people lucky enough to live in
safe areas (“the affluent”) to the less lucky residents living in lowlying areas in storms’ paths (“the poor”). But this conjecture, that
subsidized flood insurance benefits the less affluent, had not been
tested. We long believed that it is wrong and that the opposite is
true: the subsidy accrues primarily to the affluent. This, for a simple
reason: those who need flood insurance most are the habitants of
properties build in proximity to the coast, where severe weather
strikes most forcefully. You don’t need to be a real estate economist
to know that people pay a premium to live close to the water. Are
we really asking middle-class taxpayers to subsidize beachfront
property owners, all in the guise of “affordability”?
To test this hypothesis, we examined Florida’s wind-peril
insurance policies, which are sold and subsidized by the state-
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quintile, we calculated the average subsidy. In Figure
2 we see a clear picture: higher quintiles of wealth get
Regressive Subsidy
a higher absolute subsidy.
Wind insurance subsidies and median household income for Florida ZIP codes.
These visual tests were complemented by regres$600
sion analysis, and the results were striking: A 1 percent increase in the Coverage variable is associated
500
with a 1.052 percent increase in the subsidy. Simply
400
put, if property A is worth twice as much as property
B, and thus the owner of property A purchases cov300
erage that is 100 percent greater than the coverage
purchased
by the owner of property B, the owner of
200
A enjoys on average a 105 percent higher absolute
100
subsidy. These results are highly statistically significant and were replicated in various specifications of
0
the statistical model.
The bottom line is clear: the wind insurance
-100
subsidies within Citizens’ policies accrue disproportionately to affluent households and the magni-200
tude of this regressive redistribution is substantial.
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
MEDIAN HH VALUE
While we are unable to measure directly the wealth
(Thousands)
of policyholders, we showed that people who buy
owned Citizens. Those data include information about each
higher coverage (namely, who own more expensive homes)—or,
individual policy and the actual premium charged. Also, by state
alternatively, people who live in wealthier ZIP codes—receive
law, the data have to include an exact estimate of the subsidy
larger subsidies, both in absolute magnitude and as a percentage
enjoyed by each policyholder—namely, how much more Citizens
of their premium.
would need to charge this policyholder to bring the premium
The estimates we derived for the correlation between wealth
to its hypothetical true risk level, which would not require a
and subsidy probably understate the true magnitude of the prosubsidy from the state.
affluent advantage. First, one of our measures of wealth—the
We wanted to see where the subsidies are concentrated. Do they
policy coverage limit—is capped by Citizens’ rules, which means
accrue to wealthier households? For that, we used two proxies for
that we are not measuring the true wealth of the people who buy
household wealth. (Citizens’ data do not include personal identimaximal coverage, and thus we are deriving downward-biased corfiers and thus could not be matched with any direct measure of
relations. Second, Citizens’ report of the subsidies—the indicated
wealth.) The first measure is Household Value: knowing the ZIP
rate changes—understates the subsidies’ true magnitude. Citizens
codes of the insured properties, we were able to examine whether
does not take into account some of the costs of providing insursubsidies are correlated with median household value within
ance—costs that private insurers would incur in running an insurthe ZIP code. The second measure is
ance scheme. Specifically, when Citizens
Coverage Limit: knowing the amount of
calculates the amount of the indicated
Figure 2
insurance purchased under each policy,
rate change, the insurer does not build
Pricier
Homes, Bigger Subsidies
we could use that as a measure of the
into the new rate the cost of reinsurAbsolute dollar value subsidy by house value
property’s value.
ance—an insurance reserve necessary
The first thing our tests showed
to protect it against the risk of pricing
$500
was that higher-wealth ZIP codes in
errors or unexpected spikes in losses.
Florida are the beneficiaries of higher
Citizens does not need such a reserve
400
subsidies. Figure 1 offers a scatterplot
because of its power, in effect, to tax
of the trend.
the citizenry or to assess all insurance
A similar picture emerges if we look
purchasers in the state of Florida.
300
at policy level data and ask whether
We have not tried to identify the
high-value policies (those attached
causal story underlying this correlation,
200
to high-value homes) receive a higher
nor are we interested in its direction.
or lower subsidy. We divided Citizens’
Causation may go either way: greater
1
2
3
4
5
policies into five quintiles according to
wealth may help people secure greater
100
the policy coverage amount. For each
subsidies, or greater subsidies may help
COVERAGE QUINTILE
ABSOLUTE SUBSIDY (in dollars)

ABSOLUTE SUBSIDY (in dollars)

Figure 1
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people move into more expensive homes. We are not interested in
causation because the troubling feature of the system has nothing
to do with any causal theory. The problem is the large positive correlation between wealth and subsidy—a correlation that conflicts
with the goals and underlying rhetoric justifying the program.
We have strong reasons to believe that a similar pattern occurs
under other government weather insurance subsidies, like the
federal flood insurance program. People insured by the NFIP pay
only a fraction of the full-risk premium. In 2006, FEMA estimated
this fraction to be 35–40 percent. Estimated by the Congressional
Budget Office, an average premium charged by the NFIP was $721,
but would cost $1,800–$2,060 without subsidy. CBO also found
that “properties covered under the NFIP tend to be more valuable
than other properties nationwide.” While the median value of a
U.S. home that year was $160,000, the median value estimated for
homes insured by the NFIP ranged from $220,000 to $400,000.
The CBO found that “much of the difference is attributable to
the higher property values in area that
are close to water.” There are 130 million
homes in the United States, but only a
small fraction of them receive subsidized
NFIP policies. Of those that do, nearly 80
percent are located in counties that rank
in the wealthiest quintile.
Despite the image—often invoked in
political debates over flood insurance—of
the subsidy going to struggling middleclass homeowners who have lived for
generations in floodplains, the reality is
different. The CBO found that 40 percent of the subsidized
coast properties in the sample are worth more than $500,000;
12 percent are worth more than $1 million. These are far higher
proportions than in the rest of the country. For inland properties
(the great majority of which do not purchase flood insurance),
only 15 percent are worth more than $500,000 and only 3 percent
more than $1 million.
The myth of the subsidized struggling homeowner is further
dispelled by another striking fact: 23 percent of subsidized coastal
properties are not the policyholders’ principal residence—they are
either vacation homes or year-round rentals. Some 47 percent of the
subsidized homes that are not principal residences are worth more
than $500,000 (and 15 percent are worth more than $1 million).

a general (desirable) feature of insurance, operating in effect like
a Pigouvian tax in internalizing an otherwise overlooked cost,
helping to make an informed cost-benefit calculation in choosing locations. Subsidized insurance rates destroy the information
value of full-risk premiums, thus suppressing the true cost of
living in severe weather zones and creating an excessive incentive
to populate attractive but dangerous locations.
Underpricing flood insurance in coastal areas has long been
associated with (and likely contributed to) excessive private development of flood zones. We know, for example, that the damage
costs of hurricanes have increased dramatically over the past
generation. But strikingly, much of the upward trend in storm
loss data, after careful adjustment for societal factors, can be
explained not by weather fluctuations, but rather by increased
concentration of property in dangerous areas.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the number of people
living in coastal areas in Florida increased by 10 million—almost

Despite the image that storm insurance subsidies go to
the middle class, 40 percent of insured coastal properties
in a CBO sample were worth more than $500,000 and
12 percent were worth more than $ 1 million.

Investment Distortions

Our discussion so far shows that government insurance produces
undesirable distributive effects: the benefits of the programs flow
disproportionately to the affluent. But there is another troubling
distortion of the existing government insurance programs: the
effect on total welfare. The primary distortion is the location of
communities: too close to the path of storms.
Insurance, if priced accurately, provides an important service
of signaling to people the risk cost of living near water. This is

fourfold—between 1960 and 2008. Coastal exposure now represents
79 percent of all property exposure in Florida, with an insured
value of $2.8 trillion (in 2012). Major hurricanes did nothing to
stop this migration. It is estimated that since Hurricane Andrew
struck the Florida coast in 1992, development more than doubled
the property value on its path. According to the Government
Accountability Office, the $25 billion in total economic losses
Andrew caused in 1992 would have resulted in more than twice
that amount—$55 billion—were it to have occurred in 2005.
The effect of the government insurance subsidy on homeowners’ location decisions can be further captured by the following
finding: According to the Heinz Center for Science, Economics,
and the Environment, in some of the areas closest to the shoreline, annual insurance rates have to be set at a whopping $11.40
per $100 of coverage to meet the risk projections. That’s over 10
percent of property value each year! At the same time, a survey of
homeowners found that participation in insurance schemes with
such high premiums would be “quite low”—about half of flood
policyholders are only willing to pay $1–$2 per $100 of annual
insurance coverage.
Not surprisingly, given the substantial subsidy provided by
NFIP insurance and the increased development along coastal
areas, the number of policies issued by NFIP increased in the
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past generation from 1.9 million to over 4.6 million. Some of
those policyholders have lived in the area long before the NFIP,
but many are newcomers, representing a repopulation enterprise
facilitated by distorted insurance contracts. In the absence of
subsidized premiums, many of these newcomers would not have
moved to their present high-risk location or would not have paid
the current high prices for the property. Indeed, one of the major
complaints of existing homeowners against the Biggert–Waters
Act was that they were unable to afford the new premiums and the
new premiums were “scaring the bejesus out of people,” making
mortgage loans unaffordable and driving away potential buyers.
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The End of Government Weather Insurance?

In delivering a subsidy that private insurance does not give, government insurance inflicts two distortions: regressive redistribution and inefficient investment in residential property. Those
distortions are not inherent to the function of insurance. They
can be attenuated, and perhaps solved, by a return to private
insurance markets.
Is there a market failure in property insurance markets justifying government takeover? It is unlikely that people underappreciate the need for such insurance, given the salience of weather
catastrophes. It is possible that some people truly cannot afford
flood or wind coverage, relying instead on post-disaster relief.
But that is hardly a justification for the existing government-run
insurance programs. Instead of being the provider of insurance,
the government can simply mandate flood insurance in areas
where some costs are otherwise shifted to the public (as it does
for homes with federally guaranteed mortgage loans). Or it can
direct subsidies only to the truly needy.
And if private markets turn out not to have the capacity to
cover all of the flood and wind risk that would be left uncovered
should all the current government subsidies be repealed wholesale,
a much more effective form of subsidy would be something along
the lines of the recently renewed Terrorism Risk Insurance Act.
Under such a regime, the federal government would play the role
of reinsurer of last resort, leaving the private market to cover all
losses up to a very high trigger point, which could be in the tens
or even hundreds of billions of dollars.
We can end this article with a call for ending government-run
weather insurance, replacing it with pinpointed, need-based subsidies. This would eliminate the inefficient incentives to develop
and redevelop coastal land, as well as the regressive redistribution.
But where is the sense in such a naive proposal?
Congress did enact a law to eliminate the flood insurance
subsidies—a bipartisan law remarkably passed in the peak days of
partisan gridlock—only to quickly toss it out in favor of an even
more widely supported bill reinstating the subsidies. Insurance
affordability, it turns out, is one of the most effective political
calls to arms, in this case resulting in a premium scheme that
will likely remain in place for decades. We can only contribute to
clarifying its enormous social cost.
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